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1  INTRODUCTION
Inherited from the mid-20
th century, the European organization of national
railways in state-owned, integrated and few regulated monopolies is not
relevant anymore. Although this has been an interesting answer to the
problems of externalities, investments and regulation, changes have occurred
in technology, demand and economical analysis. In particular, economists
have proposed many regulation schemes, which lead the regulators to
increase the efficiency of the firms operating on the market. 
Because of the high costs of rail transportation, governments have decided to
liberalize the market; in particular, the European Commission and the
European Parliament wish the passenger rail market opening. However, some
countries, still have not opened their passenger rail market, which is currently
monopolized by the historic and national operator, the SNCF in France. 
In this paper, we assume that for social, political and economic (economies of
density, network externalities, transactional costs) reasons, the regional
passenger traffic will remain operated by the SNCF, in the coming years.
However, we propose a regulation framework, based on yardstick competition
(comparisons of performances), which could encourage the SNCF to improve
the efficiency of its regional services. 
In the first part of the paper, we discuss the implementation of yardstick
competition on the French market of regional rail transport operation. Sections
2 and 3 describe the institutional organization of the market and what is called
yardstick competition. Then, section 4 discusses how it could be implemented
on this market. We show that, paradoxically to the preservation of the SNCF
monopoly, the market structure of the regional rail transport is suitable for
such an implementation of yardstick competition. 
In the second part, we examine some theoretical, economic models. On the
one hand, sections 5 and 6 explain why the use of comparisons benefits to
the rail regulators (reduction of uncertainty, reduction of its capture by the
operator…). On the other hand, section 7 reviews and discusses some limits
of the mechanism (collusion, and investment incentives).
In the third part, we present the results of an econometric treatment,
estimating the efficiency scores of the regional operators. Section 8 resolves
the question of external heterogeneity between the operators. Then section 9
reports the followed methodology (cost frontier) and the outcomes of the
model. It appears that the only explanatory variable of the external inefficiency
is the delinquency rate: in some regions, the operator has to employ more
ticket inspectors due to delinquency. Operators’ corrected efficiency scores
vary from 1 (for the best) to 1.18 (for the worst). Those internal inefficiencies
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Hence, we conclude that yardstick competition could be an original and
efficient way of introducing “intramodal” competition in the regional passenger
rail market, before competition for the market would be adopted in France.
2  INSTITUTIONAL ORGANIZATION OF THE FRENCH REGIONAL
RAILWAYS
France is divided in 22 regions; the map below represents the French rail
network, with the different regions. 
In 1997, an “experimentation” period began: 6 regions became regulators of
their rail transport services (TER - Regional Express Trains), which they
defined (timetables) and subsidized. Since 2002, due to the SRU law
(December 2000), the whole 20 French regions 
1 were given the competence
in regulating their TER; but they are currently faced with two linked difficulties:-  On the one hand, they cannot choose another operator than the SNCF,
which keeps its legal monopoly for operating the whole French passenger
network. So, the regions cannot use franchising (competition for the
market).
-  On the other hand, their expertise is still insufficient, compared with that of
the historic operator. So, there is a strong informational asymmetry.
At the beginning of 2002, each region signed a contract with the SNCF,
delegating it its TER services for 5 to 10 years. 
Some summary statistics describe the characteristics of an average regional
network in 2002:
-  number of passenger-kilometres (PK): 450 000 000 
-  number of train-kilometres (TrK): 7 080 000 
-  load factor: 63.5 passengers per train 
-  length of lines: 1157 km
-  daily route length of a TER: 75 km
-  average commercial speed: 70.7 km/h (in 1998)
-  average cost coverage by the traffic revenues: 40 % 
-  rolling stock: 250 body shells
-  operating income (tickets revenues and subsidies): 100 M€ 
-  operating result: 3.7 M€ 
We now analyse what is yardstick competition and how it could be
implemented within the regional rail regulation.
3  THE PRINCIPLE OF YARDSTICK COMPETITION
Through their reflection on the regulation of network industries (transport,
energy, water, communication), economists have developed a theory of
yardstick competition following three observations:
-  there are (natural) monopolies, it is necessary to regulate in order to
provide against abuses from the firm running the monopoly;
-  an efficient regulation is faced with informational asymmetry;
-  when several firms are running similar monopolies in separate markets,
they emit informational externalities, of which the regulator can take
advantage by comparisons between the firms. Collecting and processing
data on production and costs lead the regulator to evaluate the relative
performance of the firms. The results of those comparisons increase the
expertise of the regulator and induce competition.
3.1  What is yardstick competition ? 
There is no precise definition of what is called yardstick competition, given
that the associated theory has led to various ways of implementation.
However, we can distinguish two main senses given to the term “yardstick
competition”.
On the one hand, this expression refers to a regulatory framework, based on
comparisons. It is a virtual form of competition between similar regulatedfirms, like Shleifer’s proposal (see below). It consists in estimating what
should be the best prices and subsidies, by comparing the performances of
several similar and regulated firms, operating on several monopoly markets. If
a firm seems to be relatively efficient according to comparisons, it has to be
rewarded. On the contrary, an inefficient firm has to be punished, so that the
comparison mechanism promotes competition. 
On the other hand, yardstick competition refers to the basic and relatively
informal use of comparisons by a regulator who wants to improve its expertise
and reduce the informational asymmetry, he is faced with. In that sense,
yardstick competition is an additional expertise tool used by the regulator to
improve the efficiency of another regulatory framework (franchising, for
example).
3.2  Yardstick competition versus benchmarking 
Benchmarking is sometimes presented as a kind of yardstick competition,
although both processes are different. First of all, benchmarking is undertaken
by the firm itself in order to improve its own performance, whereas yardstick
competition is undertaken by the regulator. Secondly, benchmarking is not
only a comparison of key indicators, but also the whole process of
improvement through the learning of others’ good practices. On the contrary,
the regulator using yardstick competition does not have to know what are the
sources of inefficiency and how the firms can improve their performances. 
3.3  The primary model of Shleifer
Shleifer’s model (1985) is at the origin of theoretical mechanisms of yardstick
competition and is subsequently relatively simple. He considers N≥2 similar
firms, operating on geographically separated but identical markets and
producing the same output. Each firm i is characterised by its marginal cost ci
and its investment in cost reduction R(ci), which are both observed by the
regulator. For each firm i, the regulator sets the price pi and distributes a
subsidy (a lump-sum transfer), Ti. In order to set prices and subsidies
according to the performances of the firms, the regulator compares each firm
to its yardstick, defined as follows. 



















Each firm i is assigned its own “shadow firm” which serves as the benchmark
in yardstick competition. Shleifer shows that the regulator can achieve the
economic optimum by setting:
-  the price of firm i, equal to the average marginal cost of the other firms:
i i c p =
-  the lump-sum transfer to firm i, equal to the average investment in cost
reduction of the other firms:  i i R T =Shleifer shows that each firm i is forced to compete with its yardstick, defined
by the performances of the other firms. This incentive scheme implicitly
defines the costs that firm i has to reach and the investments in cost
reduction, it should make, in order to have a positive profit.
3.4  Correcting external heterogeneity
Given that each yardstick is defined by the costs and investments of the other
firms, it is highly necessary to correct the external heterogeneity, as, actually,
the assumption of identical environment is not acceptable. As the costs of the
firms are influenced by factors associated to each environment, uncorrected
external heterogeneity would distort the yardstick and, then, leads to an
inefficient comparison mechanism. This important question would be
discussed hereafter, in section 8.
4  IMPLEMENTATION OF YARDSTICK COMPETITION
At first sight, Shleifer’s model with several similar firms seems far away from
the real regional rail markets, which are nowadays still monopolized by the
SNCF. Moreover, the regional rail operators do not have any particular status,
for they are only geographically separated departments (as opposed to
subsidiaries) of the historic operator. However, this paradox is not so
important if we consider the current trend towards market opening. In
particular, the recent reform of 2002, which regionalized the market, leads to
an easy implementation of yardstick competition.
We believe that the implementation of yardstick competition at this regional
scale by a common agency of regional regulators (within the GART –
Transport Authorities Group or the ARF – French Regions Association) could
underline some productivity gains, which the regulator will incite the operators
to generalize. So, in our case, the “operators” would be the regional
departments of the SNCF who have signed contract with a region; the
regulator would be a common agency of regional regulators. This comparison
process would lead both to increase the performance of the operators and the
expertise of the regional regulators.
4.1  How to develop incentives ?
The theoretical models of the economic literature introduce a financial
mechanism linked to the results of the comparisons to enforce a competitive
pressure. Those models show that gains expectation and penalty threat
generate such a competitive behaviour. However, as our operators are
departments (without budgetary autonomy) of the SNCF, incentive gains and
penalties would offset each other automatically within the global budget of the
company. Thus, we can fear that the financial incentives would not have any
impact, given the market structure: whatever the efforts of the regional
operators, the central financial result of the comparison mechanism will be the
same (an ex post reimbursement of the sum of the regional costs). However,
the experience proves the relevance of such financial incentives, in thiscontext of region-SNCF contractualization 
2: those mechanisms motivate,
within the company, work teams and managers (who bring up a reputation
effect) alike.
In practice, a financial mechanism is not the only way to lead to a competitive
behaviour. In particular, the use of comparisons in addition to the current
regulation sheme induces competition between the regulated operators for the
two following reasons: 
-  a reputation effect arises: no operator can afford to have a much worse
image than the others. This effect appears as soon as the regulator widely
spreads the results of its comparisons;
-  a belief effect plays: if the regulator can convince its operators of its
attachment to the results of the comparative mechanism, he can create an
additional competitive pressure. In particular, the threat of non-renewal of
the contract when the market would be opened can induce such an effect.
Such an application of yardstick competition, which we propose in addition to
the current regulation of the French regional rail transport, is thus in keeping
with a regulation power exerted by regional, relatively benevolent regulators
who wish to reduce their subsidies and to maintain the horizontal integration
of the SNCF monopoly (and subsequently a relative social peace).
4.2  In the future, yardstick competition and franchising
It is foreseeable that in the near future, the European laws would force France
to open its regional rail markets and to implement franchising (competition for
the market) as a way to regulate these markets. Although the concepts of
yardstick competition and competition for the market are clearly different, we
pretend - following Bouf & Péguy (2001) - that those two ways of regulating
operators are rather complementary. 
Using yardstick competition in addition to franchising leads the regulator to
improve the incentive scheme. First, yardstick competition contribute to
prevent collusion between the bidders by reducing the benefit of it (which
consists of a monopoly rent shared by the cartel members). Secondly, it
provides performance incentives through the whole period of the franchising
contract. Last, franchising allows the regulator to change the management of
an operator which seems to be inefficient, according to comparisons.
So, yardstick competition could be interestingly implemented for the regulation
of the French regional rail transport. Moreover, this form of regulation is
flexible enough to be implemented through different ways: in connection with
franchising or not, with a financial mechanism or not. We now discuss in the
two following sections some more sophisticated models which illustrate how
the comparisons lead to reduce informational asymmetry.5  COMPARISONS REDUCE UNCERTAINTY
5.1  The moral hazard problem
In a moral hazard case, operators can be faced with a commercial risk (if
demand decreases) or an industrial one (if costs increase more than prices).
Due to hazard, the operator faces uncertainty which it can fear (risk-adverse
operator) or not (risk-neutral operator):
-  consider a state-owned operator, running a public utility service which
suffers no interruption. This operator is quite sure that it cannot go
bankrupt, because of its public ownership and the necessity of ensuring
the continuity of the service. It is ensured to be recapitalized sooner or
later. Thus, such an operator does not fear uncertainty, knowing it is
potentially ensured against risk. Such a behaviour toward risk is said risk-
neutral.
-  consider, now, a private operator. It cannot assume that its shareholders
would accept every time the financial impact of random events. Hence,
such an operator fears uncertainty. It is said risk-adverse. In a regulatory
framework, the regulator has to pay this operator a fixed incentive (a risk
insurance), in order to offset the risk, the operator is faced with.
We now analyse, in this moral hazard case, how comparisons might reduce
the uncertainty and then the risk insurance payment.
5.2  Modelling uncertainty
Many authors model the uncertainty which affects operator i’s production by
the following elements: 
-  a common uncertainty parameter, η, which affects the whole operators of
the sector. This variable includes mainly the situation of the sector (overall
economic, social, political, competitive…situation).
-  an independent particular risk, εi, which includes local impact on
production (weather, difficulties caused by a third party…). 
Thus, the risks (η+εj), the operators are facing, are correlated to the extent
that the firms are similar. Mathematically, var(η)>>var(εj) ensures a good
correlation.
5.3  Theoretical results
Holmström (1982) shows that, in such a configuration, the use of comparisons
improves the welfare. The results are the following:
-  if operators are risk-neutral, yardstick competition is as interesting for the
regulator as the other regulation schemes which do not use comparisons. 
-  if operators are risk-adverse, the economic efficiency is improved by
comparisons as soon as there is common uncertainty (η≠0). This
improvement increases with the number of compared operators.
The underlying idea is rather intuitive (see figure below). Capturing all the
relevant information about η, included within the outcome measures, leads theregulator to neutralise the impact of common uncertainty. The outcomes then
depend only on the εj’s and the efficiency of the operators (assuming that
external heterogeneity is corrected). Thus the risk, an operator is faced with,
is reduced from (η+εi) to εi. 
Following that result, the higher the ratio var(η)/var(εj) is, the more the
comparisons are relevant. The regulator who reduces by this way the
uncertainty can then decrease its risk-insurance payment to the regulated
operators. 
5.4  Application to regional rail transport 
Holmström’s model can be perfectly applied to the regional rail transport: the
homogeneity of the 20 regional environments ensures a high ratio var(η)/
var(εj), which guarantees the relevance of the comparisons in the moral
hazard case.
The common element of the uncertainty, η, includes changes in the SNCF
labour legislation, prices increase, national strikes, etc.
The idiosyncratic element of the uncertainty, the εj, takes into account the
impact of regional traffic disruptions (due to the weather, local strikes and
difficulties).
In practice, we are few interested in the moral hazard case, because of the
stability of the operator’s environment (which ensures a low uncertainty) and
because of the relative risk neutrality of the operators. However, we are rather
interested in the adverse selection configuration.
6  COMPARISONS REDUCE INFORMATIONAL RENT
6.1  The adverse selection problem
In the adverse selection problem, the regulator cannot distinguish (because of
informational asymmetry) the high-efficient operators from the low-efficient
ones. Then it cannot costlessly force high-efficient operators to exert a lot of
uncertainty
εi η η + εi
comparison effectefforts, rather than to have a quiet life. To prevent those operators from
passing themselves off as low-efficient operators, the regulator has to
encourage them to reveal their high-efficient identity; to reach this goal, it has
to pay them an informational rent;
We now analyse, in this adverse selection case, how comparisons might
reduce the informational asymmetry on operators’ identity, and hence the
informational rent.
6.2  Modelling productivity
The operators’ productivity model is designed like the uncertainty model: one
distinguishes a common element (whose impact would be reduced by the
comparisons) and a residual particular one. So, many authors model the
productivity parameter, β
i, which characterises each operator i (assumed to be
risk-neutral) by the following elements: 
-  a common part,  {} 2 1 b , b b∈ , which is the same for every similar operator of
the market. This variable reflects statutory, regulation, organisational…
particularities of the market. b1 corresponds to high-efficient operators,
whereas b2 refers to low-efficient ones.
-  a particular part, ε
i. This individual characteristic includes the effects on the
efficiency of operator i’s decisions (investments, management…).
6.3  Theoretical results
Auriol (2000) proves that, in such a configuration, the use of comparisons
improves the regulation efficiency. She considers that the regulator proposes
the operators a revealing menu of contracts. She shows that operators
choose the contract which corresponds to their productivity parameter, β
i.
Hence, they reveal their common part, b1 or b2. Knowing this information, the
regulator is able to reduce the informational rent of the high-efficient
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reduced informational rent
b1 firms’ informational rent6.4  Application to regional rail transport 
Regional rail transport presents such a large homogeneity that Auriol’s model
seems very suitable. The operators are highly correlated (α close to 1, we
lead to Shleifer’s model) and the operators’ risk neutrality assumption is quite
rational. Moreover, the threat of exclusion from the market is more and more
credible given the future rail market opening.
In this adverse selection framework, the common part of the efficiency, b,
reflects the average cost of the service. It includes SNCF rules which
guarantee the same operation processes and the same wages whatever the
region.
The idiosyncratic part, the ε
i’s, reflects the regional management efficiency:
spatial organization, resources optimization, bargaining power, etc.
7  SOME THEORETICAL LIMITS
We now analyse yardstick competition in a dynamic context, since, actually,
the robustness of a regulation framework has to be considered through time.
We discuss two common limits of a regulation framework: collusion and
investment incentives
7.1  The collusion between compared operators 
Collusion is the co-operative behaviour between operators which should – on
the contrary – compete against each other. A collusion threat arises when
operators are regulated by yardstick competition because they foresee, they
get zero rent from the mechanism proposed by the regulator if they play non
co-operatively. Hence, they are willing to co-ordinate their messages to
countervail the regulator’s power. 
In particular, the “revealing principle” used by Auriol may become inefficient if
operators collude. Consider the model of the operators’ productivity in the
case of adverse selection, with a parameter  { } 2 1 b , b b∈ , distinguishing high-
efficient operators from low-efficient ones. At first sight, high-efficient
operators seem to be able to collude and announce a low-efficient
characteristic. This would permit them to exert a lower effort than the optimal
one. In this case, collusion, directly distorting the comparison yardstick,
reduces the incentive effect of yardstick competition. 
However, Auriol’s particular model is so designed that the mechanism
suppresses any collusion incentive. The best choice for the operators,
whatever their productivity characteristic is, consists in choosing the contract
corresponding to their productivity. 
Paradoxically, although our operators are departments of the same monopoly
firm, the collusion threat does not seem very credible, as we propose to use
comparisons in addition to the existing regulation framework. Moreover, given
the number of operators (20) and the complexity of the internal cost structure,
the agreement possibilities are reduced. All the more because SNCF costs
begin to be known and supervised, any convergent change can be easilydetected. Last, collusion should not be the best strategy for rail operators,
while the market is opening.
7.2  Reaching an adequate investment level
Although, some authors – see Dalen (1998) – show that yardstick competition
could reduce investment incentives in some cases, this limit should not be a
problem in practice, given the characteristics of the regional rail regulation.
The main reason for this is that the operators finance a very little part of the
investments: the infrastructure manager and the local authorities finances
infrastructure and station renewals, whereas the regions finance the rolling
stock investments. 
So, we believe that these theoretical dynamic limits are problematic. It
remains to resolve the question of the external heterogeneity.
8  CORRECTING EXTERNAL HETEROGENEITY
After having presented Shleifer’s model, we noticed the need to control for the
external heterogeneity which influences operator’s performances, and then
the yardstick they are compared to. We now illustrate how external
heterogeneity impacts on the operator’s performances and how it can be
corrected. One usually distinguishes the two following types of heterogeneity:
8.1  Endogenous heterogeneity
This section refers to Bivand & Szymanski (1997) who analysed this effect of
endogenous heterogeneity, which they define as “spatial dependence effect”.
What is endogenous heterogeneity
Endogenous heterogeneity may arise as soon as the regulatory framework
differs between the compared operators. If yardstick competition is
implemented by a unique, centralised regulator, every regulated operators are
faced with the same requirements. In such a case, there is no endogenous
heterogeneity. However, if there is decentralisation, each operator is faced
with its own regulator’s requirements. Endogenous heterogeneity arises from
particular policies of each regulator. 
For example, a regulator (1) could require a very high quality of service from
its operator 1 and pay the (relatively high) associated price. In this case,
operator 1 seems inefficient (because of its high costs) if the service quality is
not taken into account. Another regulator (2) could be financially benevolent
toward its operator 2. This operator would appear relatively inefficient, for its
costs are high, due to the benevolence of its regulator. If comparisons done
by a third regulator (3) cannot take into account those particular policies, they
would be distorted in favour of operator 3, which would be compared to
apparently inefficient operators. Such policies generate externalities which influence the operators’
performances and, subsequently the comparison yardstick. 
How to correct endogenous heterogeneity in our case
As we explained it in section 2, each regional operator faces a regional
regulator, what leads us to prevent endogenous heterogeneity. We consider
that our regional regulators are too captive and thus not benevolent enough to
pursue a featherbedding policy. However, the different regulators’ involvement
in the development of their TER services would be a major source of
endogenous heterogeneity. 
Contrary to other network industries (water and energy supply,
communication) which have to serve the whole population, always and
everywhere, the access rate to regional rail transport is defined by the
regional regulator, knowing that it is not possible to serve the whole regional
population. So, particular political choices concerning rail transport can distort
the results if we compare traffics: If a region wishes to develop rail services on
structurally low traffic lines, its operator would appear less efficient than that of
a region which develops rail only on major axes. This is the very reason why,
following Nash (2000) 
3, we consider, as the operators’ production, the
number of train-kilometres they operate, in order to reduce endogenous
heterogeneity. 
Moreover, to reduce the impact on costs, it is highly necessary to correct this
heterogeneity by including the corresponding factors (quality and/or frequency
of service, rolling stock investments…) required in the estimated cost function,
as it should be done to correct exogenous heterogeneity.
8.2  Exogenous heterogeneity
For rail transport services, exogenous heterogeneity is caused by the
environment. That kind of heterogeneity is due neither to the operator nor to
the regulator. This environmental heterogeneity arises from the infrastructure
supply (track and slot quality, network spatial structure…), social particularities
(delinquency rate) and many others…
In order to correct those sources of distortion, the solution consists in
introducing a measure of those factors in the estimation of the cost function. It
means that the accounting cost of the service has to be regressed through an
econometric process before being used in the comparisons. This is what we
present now.
9  A COST FRONTIER ESTIMATION OF EFFICIENCY SCORES
9.1  Data and methodology
Although we focus on the current structure of the regional markets,
regionalization happened too recently (2002), for us to have enough data.
This is the very reason of our using data of 1997 and 1998. The data base we
use comes from the regional accounts of the SNCF. For each year and eachregion, several data are given: average speed, number of Train-kilometres,
traffic, investments and detailed costs. In this section, we show there is
efficiency heterogeneity which yardstick competition could reduce. 
According to what we exposed before, we estimate operators’ efficiency
through a panel cost frontier, based on their operating costs (Cit). The
operating cost is the sum of the following charges: driving, ticket inspection,
energy, maintenance, ticket selling shunting, management, structure; it does
not include charges which the SNCF does not control (infrastructure fees). So,
we consider the productive and cost efficiency.
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where TrKit is the production (number of train-kilometres) of operator i in year t
and LLit is the length of the regional rail network.
wk,it is the unit cost of the k
ith input for operator i in year t. Given that all our
operators are faced with the same unit costs, which are defined for the whole
SNCF, whatever i is, for a given couple (k,t), all wk,it are equal. This allows us
to simplify our cost function which only depends on the production. 
vit is the stochastic term, corresponding to random shocks on each operator i.
uit corresponds to the logarithm of the cost inefficiency.
We add to those variables the six Zk variables which correct external
heterogeneity:  it
1 k
it , k k 0 it Z u ε + δ + δ = ∑
≥
-  Delinq: the delinquency rate
-  Load: the load factor increases costs
-  PK: the traffic should increase costs
-  Exp: a dummy variable if the operator faces a regional regulator 
4
-  Speed: the average speed
-  K: the rolling stock capital
9.2  Efficiency scores
The results 
5 of the frontier models are the following: 





Variables Coefficient t-test Coefficient t-test Coefficient t-test
Constant 1.266 5.45 0.8948 62.1 2.460 12.4
ln TrK 1.177 35.0 1.226 78.2 1.033 39.0
ln LL - 0.08707 -1.88 -0.09949 -3.46 -0.08723 -2.01
Constant 0.05309 0.16 -0.05082 -1.07 -0.03764 -1.98
Delinq 2.088 2.02 2.555 3.41 3.584 4.91








γ   0.966 19.8 0.999 688 0.999 237
Log-L 63.94 71.76 63.38The first model corresponds to the complete estimation, although many
variables are not significant. We reject the second model because of the
negative sign of the coefficient corresponding to the traffic variable (PK); a
positive coefficient would have had sense. Finally, in the third model only the
delinquency rate is kept as a Zk variable; this is due to the relatively high
delinquency in the South of France, what leads the SNCF to employ more
ticket inspectors and people in the stations to prevent delinquency. The















The efficiency scores of each regional operator i are calculated by the
average of the exp(εit) and are normalized to 1 for the best operator 
6. For the
third model, they vary from 1 for the region Centre to 1.18 for the region
Basse-Normandie (see the graph bellow). It means that, in this region, there is
18 % of cost overrun. The resulting inefficiency may be due to spatial
organization, sub-optimal employee rotations, operating rural trains with two




























10  CONCLUSION: 
Finally, we can briefly conclude with the following remarks:
1.  Although the SNCF monopoly with its regional departments seems far
away from the yardstick competition models, we showed that it is possible
to induce the same incentive effect by comparing regional performances.
Comparisons lead to reduce both uncertainty and informational rents.
2.  The main difficulty when implementing yardstick competition is the control
of the external heterogeneity. We proposed three cost frontier models
based on a sample of panel data, in order to measure the efficiency of the
regional operators.
3.  The econometric results show that the return to scale are rather constant.
The efficiency scores – varying from 1 to 1.18 show that the regional
heterogeneity in terms of efficiency among the operators is quite important.
So we believe that implementing yardstick competition could be an interesting
way of improving the TER performances, given the current regulatory
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